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ENDOGENOUS GROWTH, CONVEXITY OF DAMAGE AND
CLIMATE RISK: HOW NORDHAUS’ FRAMEWORK SUPPORTS
DEEP CUTS IN CARBON EMISSIONS*
Simon Dietz and Nicholas Stern
‘To slow or not to slow’ (Nordhaus, 1991) was the first economic appraisal of greenhouse gas
emissions abatement and founded a large literature on a topic of worldwide importance. We offer
our assessment of the original article and trace its legacy, in particular Nordhaus’s later series of
‘DICE’ models. From this work, many have drawn the conclusion that an efficient global emissions
abatement policy comprises modest and modestly increasing controls. We use DICE itself to provide
an initial illustration that, if the analysis is extended to take more strongly into account three
essential elements of the climate problem – the endogeneity of growth, the convexity of damage and
climate risk – optimal policy comprises strong controls.
1. To Slow or Not to Slow
‘To slow or not to slow’ by Bill Nordhaus (1991) is a landmark in economic research.
As the first analysis of the costs and benefits of policies to abate greenhouse gas
emissions,1 it opened the profession to a new field of application – climate change. Its
importance is partly illustrated by the number of times that it has been cited – on 1,150
occasions according to Google Scholar; 398 times according to the narrower, journals-
only measure in ISI Web of Knowledge.2
The context within which Nordhaus’s paper was written helps us understand its
contribution. While the basic science of the greenhouse effect was set out in the
nineteenth century by Fourier, Tyndall and Arrhenius, discussions surrounding the
possible role of humans in enhancing it – and therefore causing global warming and
climate change – began in earnest in the 1970s. For at least a decade, climate change
remained largely a scientific/environmentalist’s issue, debated in specialist confer-
ences and networks (Agrawala, 1998). Indeed, it is important to stress that the science
of climate change was running years ahead of the economics (something that arguably
remains the case today in understanding the impacts of climate change; Stern, 2013).
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By the late 1980s, however, climate change was becoming both a policy issue and
increasingly political. In 1988, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) was established and in 1990 it published the first of its regular and
influential Assessment Reports to member governments. In 1989, the first meeting
of (22) Heads of State to discuss climate change was held in the Netherlands and
various other major international summits that year also put it on the agenda. Most
OECD countries already had their first climate-change targets by 1990 (Gupta,
2010), for instance the European Community, as it was then, had pledged to
stabilise its carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. In 1992, virtually all
countries signed up to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC) at a major summit on the environment and development in Rio
de Janeiro, with its objective to achieve ‘stabilization of greenhouse gas concentra-
tions in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system’ (Article 2).
Yet despite the obvious ecological risks of unmitigated climate change, the question
remained whether the benefits of avoiding these risks would outweigh the perhaps
substantial cost of cutting emissions.3 This is the central question that ‘To slow or not
to slow’ sought to tackle, by combining a simple model of social welfare and
production with an externality from greenhouse gas emissions, in general equilibrium.
This model took ‘existing models and simplified them into a few equations that are
easily understood and manipulated’ (p. 920), something that has become a hallmark
of Nordhaus’s work in the area. In summary, the main components of the model are:
(i) a single equation of motion for the global mean temperature, which rises in
response to the difference between the temperature that would be obtained in
long-run equilibrium, given the current atmospheric stock of greenhouse
gases, and the current temperature;
(ii) an equation of motion for the atmospheric stock of greenhouse gases, in
which some fraction of current emissions adds to the stock, at the same time as
some fraction of the current stock ‘decays’ by diffusing into the deep ocean;4
(iii) a social welfare function that is the discounted sum over time of utility per
capita;5
(iv) utility takes the form of the logarithm of consumption per capita of a single,
aggregate good;
3 There is a problem in using the language of benefit–cost analysis, if it is interpreted in its common and
narrow, marginal, fairly undynamic way and where risk is also treated narrowly. Climate-change policy raises
major questions of the strategic management of potentially immense risks and where different paths will have
different endogenous learning and discovery. This broader perspective is a major focus of this study and
should be central to economic research on the topic.
4 To get an idea of the simplicity of the modelling framework, especially the science module, note that a
fully fledged atmosphere–ocean general circulation model such as that of the UK Hadley Centre would
comprise hundreds of thousands of equations.
5 There is little plausibility in moral philosophy for a social welfare function that is the sum across
generations of the (discounted) utility per capita of each generation, irrespective of the number of people in a
generation, unless population is constant. Adding the (undiscounted) total utility of each generation is
essentially utilitarian. Pure-time discounting can be given a utilitarian interpretation if the discounting is
based on the probability of existence as a function of time, and that becomes an exponential function in
continuous time if the end of the world is the first event in a Poisson process.
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(v) consumption per capita is given by (exogenous) output, less the total cost of
abating emissions, and the total cost of climate change;
(vi) a reduced-form abatement cost function, in which the total cost of abatement
depends on global aggregate emissions and emissions abatement; and
(vii) reduced-form damage, in which the total cost of climate change depends on
global mean temperature but where global mean temperature is an index of
a wider set of climatic changes including changes in precipitation and sea
level.
This modelling framework has had a lasting influence on the field and indeed
several elements of it still constitute the ‘industry standard’ today. The most notable
example of this is perhaps the idea of reduced-form damage.
According to the model, Nordhaus found that an optimal cut in the current flow of
global emissions of 11% relative to the base level should be made in a medium scenario
(given a rate of pure-time preference of 1% per annum and ‘medium’ damage). In a
‘high’ scenario, with no pure-time discounting and ‘high’ damage, a cut of global
emissions of around one third would be optimal. The concluding Section of this article
lays out these results, without commenting on the plausibility of the various scenarios.
Nonetheless, that the optimal emissions cuts were not more than one third implied that
only modest targets could be supported by economic analysis of this kind, in comparison
with some targets being discussed in the political arena. As the editor of the issue in
which the paper appeared wrote, it is ‘certainly a sobering antidote to some of the more
extravagant claims for the effects of global warming’ (Greenaway, 1991, p. 903).
2. The DICE Model Framework
While it was very much the purpose of ‘To slow or not to slow’ to cast climate-change
mitigation as a dynamic, investment problem, in which abatement costs could be paid up
front, so that climate change could be avoided several decades into the future, themodel
dynamics were unsatisfactory – the economy was assumed to be in a so-called ‘resource
steady state’, in which all physical flows are constant. Therefore, we were asked to
consider the setting as being the middle of the twenty-first century, when such
conditions might plausibly hold (we can now see that this is highly unlikely). Optimal
emissions abatement was calculated by evaluating a marginal change to the steady-state
level (and thus the optimal cuts mentioned above were in the steady state). Time was still
relevant though, because, while the change in abatement costs was instantaneous, the
change in damage costs would be experienced only after a delay (Equations 7–9, p. 926).
Nordhaus himself was well aware of the shortcomings and indeed a preliminary
version of a more fully dynamic model had already been presented at a workshop by
the time ‘To slow or not to slow’ had been published. This new model was called DICE
(for a ‘dynamic integrated climate-economy’ model) (Nordhaus, 1992, 1993a,b, 1994).
Many elements of ‘To slow or not to slow’ could still be found in the original DICE
model, including the equation of motion of the atmospheric stock of CO2, log
utility and reduced-form abatement and damage costs. But at the core was a Ramsey–
Cass–Koopmans model of economic growth, allowing evaluation not only of the
optimal steady state but also of the optimal transition path. The social welfare function
© 2015 The Authors.
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was modified to include population, with the objective becoming the (pure-time)
discounted sum of total, instantaneous social utility, while a slightly more complex
model of temperature change was also added. Once again, the results of the analysis
with DICE pointed to modest emissions controls, modestly increasing over time – from
10% initially to 15% in the later twenty-first century.
Since these first studies with the DICE model, it has become the pre-eminent
integrated assessment model (IAM) in the economics of climate change. New versions
have been published periodically (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Nordhaus, 2008), and a
regionally disaggregated model (RICE) was also developed (Nordhaus and Yang,
1996). However, to look only at Nordhaus’s own studies with DICE is to understate its
contribution hugely, because, by virtue of its simple and transparent unification of
growth theory with climate science (not to mention Nordhaus’s considerable efforts to
make the model code publicly available), it has come to be very widely used by others.
The uses to which it has been put are too numerous to cover in a comprehensive
manner. Some of the more significant examples include: the introduction of induced
innovation in the energy sector (Popp, 2004); explicit evaluation of optimal adaptation
policy (de Bruin et al., 2009); consideration of uncertainty and learning (Kolstad, 1996;
Keller et al., 2004); and treating consumption of material goods and environmental
quality separately, thus allowing evaluation of relative price changes (Sterner and
Persson, 2008).
Some of these extensions have challenged the broad conclusion that optimal
emissions control is modest. And indeed it is important to stress two things. First,
through his own updating of DICE, Nordhaus’s position, as formalised in the model
and its results, has shifted over the years towards stronger emissions reductions,
albeit incrementally. Second, one can readily see in Nordhaus’s writings an
awareness of the limitations of IAMs like DICE. Nonetheless, it is fair to say the
perception remains that an analysis of the costs and benefits of climate change in
an IAM does not support strong emissions cuts, under standard assumptions. For
instance, in the wake of the publication of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate
Change (Stern, 2007) (which in fact used an IAM other than DICE), it has been
suggested that the difference in policy recommendations between the Review and
other studies lies very largely in the specification of a low pure-time discount rate
(Nordhaus, 2007), a rate that some have questioned.6 A central purpose of the rest
of this article is to explore whether a recommendation of modest emissions
reductions does indeed follow from using the DICE framework. We ask, can the
framework support strong controls on emissions, if restrictive assumptions about
growth, damage and climate risk are relaxed? These assumptions arguably lead to
gross underestimation of the benefits of emissions reductions in DICE and other
IAMs (Stern, 2013).
First, we incorporate endogenous drivers of growth and we allow climate change to
damage these drivers. This is in stark contrast to the current generation of IAMs, which
rests directly or indirectly on the Ramsey–Cass–Koopmans model, where the major
6 A careful exploration of the strong basis in moral philosophy for low pure-time discounting is provided
in Stern (2014a,b). In many IAM studies, high pure-time discounting is introduced without much discussion.
© 2015 The Authors.
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source of growth per capita in the long run is exogenous improvements in productivity,
but where climate change only impacts on current output.7 There are compelling
reasons for thinking that climate change could have long-lasting impacts on growth
(Stern, 2013) and there is now an emerging body of empirical evidence pointing in this
direction (Dell et al., 2012), even though climatic conditions in the recent past have
been relatively stable compared with what we now have to contemplate.
Second, we assume that the damage function linking the increase in global mean
temperature with the instantaneous reduction in output is highly convex at some
temperature. Consideration of some of the science, for example, on tipping points,
leads us in this direction (Weitzman, 2012). By contrast, most existing IAM studies
assume very modest curvature of the damage function. The DICE default is quadratic
and it is well known that with the standard values of the functions’ coefficients an
implausible 18°C or so of warming is required in order to reduce global output by 50%.8
Third, we allow for explicit and large climate risks. We do so by considering the
possibility of high values of the climate-sensitivity parameter; i.e. the increase in global
mean temperature, in equilibrium, accompanying a doubling in the atmospheric
concentration of carbon dioxide. We conduct sensitivity analysis on high values but
also specify a probability distribution reflecting the latest scientific knowledge on the
climate sensitivity as set out in the recent IPCC report (IPCC, 2013). Its key
characteristic is a fat tail of very high temperature outcomes that are assigned low
probabilities. By contrast, most IAM studies have ignored this key aspect of climate risk
by proceeding with a single, best guess value for the climate sensitivity, typically
corresponding to the mode of the IPCC distribution. We note, linking the second and
third points here, that the model temperature increase under business as usual a
century or so from now of 3.5 or 4°C (IPCC, 2013) could be extremely damaging – this
is not just a ‘tail’ issue.
Otherwise we remain faithful to the standard DICE framework, in order to make as
clear as possible the difference that these three extensions make. Most notably, we
retain its usual parameterisation of social values, where the rate of pure-time
preference is 1.5% and the elasticity of marginal social utility of consumption is 1.5,
so that with growth of consumption per capita of, say, 2%, the social discount rate would
be 4.5%. We have written elsewhere about why we think it is inappropriate to posit such
a high rate of pure-time preference (Stern, 2013, 2014 a,b) – and we return to explain
why in Section 5 – but for the purpose of clarity of comparison we set aside our
misgivings, concerning this and other features, in the modelling that comprises the
core of this study. More generally, there is a powerful case for arguing that this type of
model, with one good and exogenous population, has very serious defects in its ability
to capture key aspects of a problem for which destruction of the environment and
potential loss of life on a major scale are central.
7 While a reduction in current output may impact future growth via reduced savings – for a given savings
rate – we hypothesise that this effect is weak compared with direct reductions in the capital stock and
reductions in productivity. Fankhauser and Tol (2005) also find a weak impact of climate change on growth
via savings, using DICE. They did not, however, consider that climate damage could work on the capital stock
or on productivity.
8 Nordhaus sees the specification of the damage function for warming above 3°C as a ‘placeholder’ (Stern,
2013) but it is a placeholder that can have a powerful effect on the conclusions as we will see below.
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3. Extending DICE
3.1. Endogenous Growth
In standard DICE, the production function is:
Yt ¼ F ðKt ;LtÞ ¼ ð1 D^tÞð1 KtÞAtK
a
t L
1a
t ; (1)
where At is the exogenous element of total factor productivity (TFP) at time t, K is
capital, L is labour and a 2 (0, 1) is the capital exponent. D^ is the standard DICE
damage multiplier (see below for a definition) and the key point is that this is the only
pathway through which climate change affects growth – directly by multiplication with
gross output in each period. Λ represents emissions abatement costs. In all of our
analysis, we maintain standard assumptions about Λ and L, detailed in Appendix A
alongside many other aspects of the model.
In (1) the long-run growth rate of output, ignoring for one moment the role of
climate change, is given by the sum of the growth rates of At and Lt as in the standard
Solow (1956) model. Climate-change damage D^t (and abatement costs Λt) affect the
level of output in each period, which means that they can have two effects on the long-
run growth rate of output. First, period-to-period changes in D^t can effectively change
the long-run output growth rate. Second, depending on the rates of saving and capital
depreciation, D^t can impact the long-run growth rate by affecting capital investment
and in turn the stock of K in future periods.
Yet one of the central points of this study is that this is a very narrow story of how
climate change impacts on growth. We, therefore, consider two extensions to (1). Both
are endogenous growth models, incorporating knowledge spillovers from the
accumulation of capital by firms. And in both models, damage from a changing
climate not only fall on gross output at a particular point in time, they also
permanently reduce output possibilities at future points in time through their effect on
endogenous determinants of growth.
3.1.1. A model of capital damage, and knowledge proportional to the capital stock
Our first growth model incorporates knowledge spillovers via the capital stock in the
tradition of Arrow (1962), Romer (1986) and others. We combine this formulation
with a partitioning of the damage multiplier between output and capital. The
production function becomes
Yt ¼ ð1 D
Y
t Þð1 KtÞAtK
aþb
t L
1a
t ; (1.K)
where DY now denotes the damage that directly reduce annual output. In this model,
we think of the economy as being composed of a number of firms, each making
investments. Growth is driven in part by learning-by-doing, which in turn depends on
each firm’s net investment, so that when the firm’s capital stock increases, so does
economy-wide productivity. We also make the standard assumption in this tradition
that knowledge is a pure public good. The elasticity of output with respect to
knowledge is b > 0, so that the knowledge process has a productivity factor Kb. These
assumptions have the effect of increasing the overall capital exponent to a + b. We
continue to assume an exogenous element of TFP A. This could be taken to represent
elements of productivity not captured in knowledge spillovers but we use it here
© 2015 The Authors.
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principally for the narrower, instrumental purpose of calibrating (1.K) on (1) in the
absence of climate-change damage and emissions abatement costs, thus achieving a
controlled comparison of different production specifications.
We suppose there is further damage from climate change that reduces the
capital stock, which we label DK , so we obtain the following equation of motion of
capital:
Ktþ1 ¼ ð1 D
K
t Þð1 d
K ÞKt þ It ; (2)
where dK 2 [0, 1] is the depreciation rate on capital and It = sYt is investment, given
savings rate s (see Appendix A). In specifying DK we have in mind the representation of
two phenomena. First, DK includes permanent, direct climate damage to the capital
stock, for example, if climate change increases the likelihood of storms and those
storms damage infrastructure, or the abandonment of capital in coastal areas due to
sea-level rise. Second, DK could indirectly include broader impacts of climate change
on productivity via the endogenous growth mechanism (1.K). One effect it could pick
up is of a changing climate on the productivity of capital stocks, accumulated during a
different and more stable climatic regime. For example, water supply infrastructure
may become less productive, given a long-run change in precipitation. Another could
be that, if investment is increasingly diverted towards repair and replacement of capital
damaged by extreme weather, it may produce fewer knowledge spillovers. Appendix A
contains further details of how, for our simulation work, we partition damage D
between DY and DK .
In sum, according to this model of growth and climate damage, some part of the
instantaneous impacts of climate change falls on capital rather than output, so that this
type of damage represents a permanent reduction in output possibilities in the future.
Moreover since the economy’s stock of knowledge is proportional to its stock of capital,
the negative effect on future output possibilities is magnified.
3.1.2. A model of endogenous TFP and damage to TFP
One constraining feature of production functions like (1.K) is that, since knowledge
is in one-for-one correspondence with the aggregate capital stock, it will depreciate
just as fast. If one considers a typical depreciation rate for economy-wide capital of
10% per year (indeed dK = 0.1 in DICE), the implication is a rapid diminution of
economy-wide knowledge over time. While the literature on measuring the returns
to R&D investment points to annual depreciation of around 15% of private, firm-
level R&D capital – see Hall et al. (2009) for a review, what we have here is a much
broader construct of knowledge concerned with overall skills and know-how.
Therefore, we offer an alternative formulation of endogenous growth – new as far
as we are aware – in which TFP is endogenous and depreciates more slowly than
capital.
We revert to the standard production function, modelling TFP through a separate
relation. The production function is hence:
Yt ¼ ð1 D
Y
t Þð1 KtÞ
AtK
a
t L
1a
t : (1.TFP)
Capital and TFP have different dynamics. The equation of motion of the capital
stock is simply given by
© 2015 The Authors.
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Ktþ1 ¼ ð1 d
K ÞKt þ It : (2
0)
Notice that in this specification, we do not allow climate damage to impact the
capital stock, although doing so would be straightforward by reverting to (2). The
equation of motion of TFP is given by
Atþ1 ¼ ð1 D
A
t Þð1 d
A
t Þ
At þ aðItÞ; (3)
where dA is the net depreciation rate for productivity. We can think of d
A as
encapsulating both:
(i) depreciation of productivity through erosion or displacement of skills and
know-how; and
(ii) implicit, autonomous growth of TFP, which captures among other things
institutional innovations, beyond the scope of this model.
Given these two effects, dA could in principle be negative but here we assume it is
positive and less than dK.
DA is the part of damage that reduces productivity. It captures the productivity
effects of climate change mentioned above. Appendix A again explains how we
partition D between DY and DA.
a(It) is a ‘spillovers’ function that converts the flow of capital investment in each
period into a flow of knowledge externalities across activities as a whole. This means
that the stock of TFP is augmented by knowledge spillovers, as well as changing over
time according to the balance of depreciation and autonomous growth due to other
factors, which is encoded in dA. In general, assume a0 ≥ 0. More specifically, in order to
again calibrate this model to standard DICE in the absence of climate damage and
abatement costs, it is necessary to assume further a0 > 0, a00 < 0, since in the standard
DICE model the growth rate of TFP falls rapidly in the initial periods.9 These
properties can be satisfied by
aðItÞ ¼ c1I
c2
t ;
where c1 > 0 and c2 2 ð0; 1Þ. Summing up, in this formulation some part of the
instantaneous impacts of climate change falls on TFP, permanently reducing future
output possibilities.
3.2. Convexity of Damage
The standard DICE damage function is of a convenient reduced form that has come to
be widely used in the field:
D^t ¼ 1 1=ð1þ p1Tt þ p2T
2
t Þ; (4)
where T is the global mean atmospheric temperature relative to the period just
before the industrial revolution. The coefficients p1 and p2 are estimated by fitting
the function on data points, which comprise the sum of underlying sectoral studies
of climate damage at particular degrees of global warming (mostly T = 2.5  3°C),
9 Whether such concavity is theoretically or empirically plausible is not for this study.
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for example, studies of crop losses and changing energy demand for space cooling
and heating.10 We should recognise, however, that these are ‘quasi’ data points,
since T = 3°C has not been seen on the planet for around 3 million years and
might lead to radical transformations in global climatic patterns. Making assump-
tions about the form of (2) is made still more difficult by the complete absence of
evidence on aggregate impacts for T ≥ 3°C. The quadratic form was originally
selected largely for convenience11 but it results in implausibly low damage at high
temperatures (Stern, 2008; Weitzman, 2012). This has prompted Weitzman (2012)
to suggest the following modification:
Dt ¼ 1 1=ð1þ p1Tt þ p2T
2
t þ p3T
6:754
t Þ; (4
0)
where the coefficient p3 and its corresponding exponent are together used to satisfy
the assumption that, at T = 6, 50% of output is lost.12 This is the functional form
we use in this study13 but, in addition to Weitzman’s calibration of p3, we offer a
second, alternative calibration such that Dt = 0.5 when T = 4. Science and impact
studies tell us that, not only could we cross several key physical tipping points in the
climate system by the time the 4°C mark is reached (Lenton et al., 2008), the
impacts of such warming on the natural environment, economies and societies
could be severe, with reason to believe in the risk of vast movements of population
and associated conflict, unrest and loss of life (Stern, 2013). Global mean
temperatures regularly exceeding 4°C above pre-industrial have probably not been
seen for at least 10 million years (Zachos et al., 2008) and are within the range of
difference between today and the peak of the last Ice Age, when large ice sheets
covered northern Europe and North America (IPCC, 2013), radically influencing
where people could be. Given the potential magnitude of transformation illustrated
by this example, the assumption that Dt = 0.5 when T = 4 may be no less plausible,
to put it cautiously, than assuming, as (2) does with the standard parameterisation,
that Dt = 0.04 when T = 4, i.e. only 4% of output is lost as a result of temperatures
not seen for 10 million plus years.
In our first growth model, we partition damage as expressed in (40) between
damage affecting output DY and those affecting capital DK , while in our second
model damage are partitioned between output and TFP as in (3). We do so in a
similar way to Moyer et al. (forthcoming) and the procedure is described in detail
in Appendix A.
10 Note that within this set of studies are some estimates of the money value of direct welfare losses due to
climate change, e.g. impacts on health and the amenity value of the environment.
11 Which is why Nordhaus himself describes such functions and the assumptions they embody about
damage at different temperatures as ‘placeholders subject to further research’ (Stern, 2013). However, we
will see data points of 4, 5 or 6°C, if we are negligent and unlucky, within decades. Hence, it makes sense to
try different formulations as representing different possibilities, including of the extremely damaging
circumstances the science suggests as possible.
12 A quadratic function could not be made to simultaneously fit the existing data, while satisfying this
additional assumption; it would give excessive damage for smaller temperature increases.
13 Elsewhere Dietz et al. (2007a,b,c); Stern (2007, 2008) we investigated models based on the PAGE IAM, in
which damage was a power function of temperature. We examined the sensitivity of damage to the exponent
of the power function up to a value of three.
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3.3. Climate Risk
Our last extension to the basic framework involves the climate sensitivity parameter.
We take two approaches here. First, we explore high values of this parameter in
sensitivity analysis. Second, we replace its sure value with a probability density function
(pdf). Climate sensitivity is a key factor in driving the change in temperature in DICE,
as it is in many other simple climate models. Thus, it is a natural example of large-scale
risk. Others would be relevant too, such as the scale of damage for a given temperature
increase, the scale of loss of life and so on.
The equation of motion of temperature is given by:
Tt ¼ Tt1 þ j1 Ft 
F2CO2
S
Tt1ð Þ  j2 Tt1  T
LO
t1
 
 
; (5)
where Ft is radiative forcing, F2CO2 is the radiative forcing resulting from a doubling
in the atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide, S is the climate sensitivity, T LO is the
temperature of the lower oceans, j1 is a parameter determining speed of adjustment
and j2 is the coefficient of heat loss from the atmosphere to the oceans. Calel
et al. (2014) contains a detailed explanation of the physics behind this equation.
In standard DICE S = 3°C. However, it has long been known that there is substantial
uncertainty about S (Charney, 1979). Moreover investigations in recent years (as
collected by Meinshausen et al., 2009) have tended to yield estimates of the pdf of S
that have a large positive skew and in most cases the right-hand tail can indeed be
defined as ‘fat’.14 In the latest IPCC report (IPCC, 2013), a subjective pdf is offered
that is the consensus of the panel’s many experts. According to this distribution, S is
‘likely’ between 1.5 and 4.5°C, where likely corresponds to a subjective probability of
anywhere between 0.66 and 1. It is ‘extremely unlikely’ to be less than 1C, where
extremely unlikely indicates a probability of ≤ 0.05, while it is ‘very unlikely’ to exceed
6°C, where this denotes a probability of ≤ 0.1. We thus choose values of S 2 {1.5, 3, 6}
for sensitivity analysis.
For our stochastic modelling we fit a continuous pdf to these data, using the mid-
points of the IPCC probability ranges. In doing so, we face a choice over the type of
function to fit. We performed a test of the fit of various functional forms, in terms of
root-mean-square error, to the IPCC probability statements and found that the log-
logistic function demonstrated the best fit among those we examined. The log-logistic
function also has the advantage of having a tail of intermediate ‘fatness’ relative to
other forms, thus, in this sense, it constitutes a middle-of-the-road assumption:
f ðSÞ ¼
a 
S
b
 a1
b 1þ
S
b
 a  ; (6)
where a  4.2 and b  2.6 are the shape and scale parameters respectively giving mean
S of 2.9, a standard deviation of 1.4 and the 95th percentile at 5.3.
14 Where the density in the upper tail approaches zero more slowly than the exponential distribution.
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It is worth emphasising, before moving on to the results, that there are other
potentially significant sources of risk attending to the impacts of greenhouse gas
emissions. Some of these are in the climate system – for instance the effective heat
capacity of the oceans (Calel et al., 2014) – yet a focus on S captures the essence of
physical climate risk in a clear and simple way. Other sources of risk relate to damage
for any given temperature and could also be modelled with probabilities, were the
evidence to justify doing so. However, as we have argued, the damage functional form
and parameterisation are currently very poorly constrained by evidence, and therefore
it seems appropriate to instead pursue this, potentially very important source of risk,
via a more simple sensitivity analysis on different functions as proposed in subsection
3.2.
4. Results
4.1. Baseline
At the heart of this exercise is an investigation into the prospects for growth and damage
in a changing climate. Figure 1 plots baseline consumption per capita – i.e. in the
absence of controls on carbon dioxide emissions imposed by a social planner – under
various scenarios over the next two centuries. The upper panel plots the forecasts of the
model with production (1.K) and damage from climate change on the capital stock,
while the lower panel plots the forecasts of the model with production (1.TFP), where
TFP growth is endogenous and where climate change reduces TFP.
The ‘standard’ trajectory represents the forecast of the standard DICE model
without the various extensions we are considering in this article. The starting year is
2005. It is of course the same in both panels and notice immediately by how much
consumption per capita increases in it, powered largely by exogenous productivity
growth15 – in 2205 it is more than 15 times the 2005 level. This is despite a large
increase in the atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide and in the global mean
temperature (discussed below). Without large assumed improvements in the exoge-
nous element of TFP, the increase in per capita consumption would be much smaller.
Changing the model of growth begins to yield more pessimistic forecasts, although it
does not by itself qualitatively alter the tendency for the future to be much better off
than the present. Under the model with capital damage, consumption/head in 2205 is
13.3 times higher than in 2005, while under the model of productivity damage it is 11.4
times higher. Since the total damage multiplier Dt in (4) is the same in the two models,
simply being partitioned differently between damage on output, capital and TFP (see
Appendix A), the larger effect in the model of productivity damage partly reflects the
longer lasting impact of climate change in this model, where depreciation of
productivity is slow compared with capital.
The divergence in forecasts is much more marked, however, when we layer on
greater convexity of damage as in (40). With Weitzman’s (2012) calibration,
consumption per capita grows much more slowly after 2150 in the model of capital
15 With no growth in labour, the long-run output growth rate implied by (1) is simply that of exogenous
TFP.
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damage, while in the model of TFP damage it peaks around 2150 before actually falling
thereafter. By 2205, it is only 8.3 and 5.8 times higher respectively than today. If the
damage function is set such that damage equivalent to 50% of global output are
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Fig. 1. Baseline Consumption Per Capita, 2005–2205
Notes. The upper panel corresponds to the model with capital damage and with knowledge
proportional to the aggregate capital stock, while the lower panel corresponds to the model of
endogenous TFP Growth and TFP damage.
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assumed to occur upon 4°C warming, the collapse in living standards is much stronger,
with consumption/head peaking before the end of this century and ending up in both
models around or below the present level in real terms. A similar forecast is generated
by Weitzman damage, when we instead increase the climate sensitivity parameter S to
6°C, which has a probability, as described above, of up to 0.1 according to IPCC. The
two growth models yield similar forecasts in these cases, demonstrating the diminished
importance of growth assumptions when instantaneous damage are severe and or
warming is very rapid.
Changes in the atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide and global mean temper-
ature, which drive these growth prospects, are shown in Figures B1 and B2
respectively in Appendix B. Baseline emissions will take the atmospheric stock of
carbon dioxide to nearly 800 ppm by the end of this century in all the scenarios
considered. The stock continues to increase after 2100 but there is some feedback
of climate damage on emissions, which works through the depressive effect of
climate damage on growth and of growth on emissions. The principal determinant
of global mean temperature is the value of the climate sensitivity parameter. With
the typical central estimate of 3°C, the global mean temperature is forecast to be in
the region of 3.5°C above the pre-industrial level by 2100, while if S = 6 it could be
more than 5°C above pre-industrial.
4.2. Optimal Controls
We now move to examining the optimal controls on emissions, set by a social planner.
As Appendix A explains, the social planner’s objective is to maximise the sum over time
of discounted total utility by choosing a set of emissions control quantities and prices
from 2015 until 2245, with a given abatement cost function (see Appendix A). We
present results covering the rest of this century. Table 1 lists the optimal emissions
control rate (the percentage or fractional reduction in emissions from the baseline)
under various scenarios, while Table 2 does the same for the optimal carbon price.16 It
is clear from the Tables that modifying the growth model and the associated pathways
through which climate change can affect the economy, as well as increasing the
convexity of the damage function, and increasing the climate sensitivity, can
significantly increase the optimal emissions control rate and the associated carbon
price, both initially and throughout.
Let us focus on initial control quantities and prices – these give us something
with which to compare current global policy efforts and debates. In standard DICE
the emissions control rate, that is the percentage reduction in industrial carbon
dioxide emissions, is 0.158 in 2015, with an associated carbon price of $44/tC in
2005 prices (divide by roughly 3.7 to obtain estimates/tCO2, and multiply by c. 1.16
to bring up to 2012 prices17). If we switch from this standard model of exogenous
16 Where the optimal carbon price is defined as the marginal cost of abatement at the optimal emissions
level calculated. Whether it is reasonable to interpret this as a price depends on the convexity of the
abatement cost curve, i.e. it depends on there being rising marginal costs. It has been contended that
marginal costs do not rise but these are issues for another paper.
17 World Bank data on GDP deflator, from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG,
retreived on 22 November 2013.
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growth to (1.K) with capital damage, the optimal emissions control rate rises to
0.213 (optimal carbon price = $76/tC). Further extending this model to
incorporate highly convex damage with Weitzman’s (2012) parameterisation, it
rises to 0.235 (optimal price = $91/tC), while with our high damage function
scenario it is 0.342 (optimal price = $178/tC). When Weitzman damage are
combined with a high climate sensitivity, the optimal control rate is 0.36, brought
about by an optimal price levied at $196/tC. Some caution should be exercised,
however, in interpreting the relevance of these strong initial control rates and
prices, because DICE, as a model of medium and long-run dynamics, lacks
adjustment costs, which could render such a rapid decarbonisation infeasible.
In the endogenous growth model (1.TFP) where instantaneous climate damage
work on TFP as well as output, the increase in the controls is even stronger. With
quadratic damage, the optimal control rate on emissions is 0.272 with an associated
carbon price of $118/tC. Moving to Weitzman damage increases this to 0.29
(optimal carbon price = $133/tC), while with our high damage function scenario
Table 1
Optimal Emissions Control Rate, 2015–2105. S = 3 Unless Otherwise Indicated
2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095 2105
Standard 0.158 0.184 0.211 0.240 0.270 0.302 0.335 0.370 0.407 0.446
Capital models
Quadratic damage 0.213 0.289 0.356 0.424 0.495 0.565 0.636 0.706 0.777 0.848
Weitzman damage 0.235 0.322 0.401 0.484 0.568 0.650 0.730 0.805 0.875 0.944
Weitzman damage, S = 6 0.360 0.494 0.619 0.751 0.883 1 1 1 1 1
High damage 0.342 0.471 0.591 0.709 0.814 0.901 0.970 1 1 1
Productivity models
Quadratic damage 0.272 0.365 0.444 0.528 0.614 0.702 0.792 0.882 0.974 1
Weitzman damage 0.290 0.392 0480 0.573 0.667 0.761 0.852 0.942 1 1
Weitzman damage, S = 6 0.432 0.584 0.722 0.868 1 1 1 1 1 1
High damage 0.396 0.538 0.663 0.783 0.891 0.984 1 1 1 1
Table 2
Optimal Carbon Prices (2005 US$/tC), 2015–2105. S = 3 Unless Otherwise Indicated
2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095 2105
Standard 44.4 57.0 71.2 87.8 106.2 127.1 150.0 175.8 204.6 236.6
Capital models
Quadratic damage 76 129 182 245 316 393 476 563 656 752
Weitzman damage 91 156 226 310 405 506 609 711 812 912
Weitzman damage, S = 6 196 337 495 684 895 1097 1074 1052 1032 1012
High damage 178 309 455 617 774 909 1017 1052 1032 1012
Productivity models
Quadratic damage 118 196 272 363 466 580 705 840 984 1012
Weitzman damage 133 222 313 420 541 670 806 945 1032 1012
Weitzman damage, S = 6 271 456 653 888 1121 1097 1074 1052 1032 1012
High damage 233 393 559 738 911 1066 1074 1052 1032 1012
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the controls are respectively 0.396 and $233/tC. When Weitzman damage is
combined with a high climate sensitivity they are respectively 0.432 and $271/tC.
Notice for both growth models the marked rise in the carbon price when we
move from Weitzman to high damage or from S = 3 to S = 6, which reflects
convexity in the marginal abatement cost function. Nonetheless, the same remarks
regarding adjustment costs and their potential effect on the optimal controls apply
here.
Figures B3 and B4 in Appendix B show the consequences of the optimal controls
for global mean temperature and the atmospheric stock of CO2. Compared with the
baseline, it can be seen that maximisation of social welfare implies significant
reductions in both climate variables. With Weitzman damage, the build-up of
atmospheric CO2 is limited to 524 ppm in the model of capital damage and 489
ppm in the model of TFP damage, while with the more pessimistic parameterisation
of the damage function the corresponding maximum concentrations are 459 and
444 ppm. These numbers are broadly in line with the types of stabilisation
concentrations recommended by many scientists. In sharp contrast, with standard
DICE the optimal emissions controls allow atmospheric CO2 to rise throughout this
century and peak at around 735 ppm in the middle of the next century. The
resulting warming depends on the climate sensitivity.
4.3. Optimal Control Under Stochastic Warming
Thus, far we have computed the optimal controls, contingent on a set of point values of
the climate sensitivity parameter, S 2 {1.5, 3, 6}. A fuller specification of climate risk
involves characterising a probability distribution over different values of S, as we
described in Section 3, and solving for the optimal path of emissions controls. The
planner’s problem is specified as maximising expected social welfare, where expec-
tations are formed before the first period commences and are not revised (see
Appendix A for further details of the optimal control problem).18 Expected values are
formed in a Monte Carlo simulation, sampling (via the Latin Hypercube method) 500
times from f (S) in (6).
Tables 3 and 4 report the optimal control quantities and prices respectively for the
two growth models, each run with the various different damage functions. Since this
exercise constitutes a fuller specification of climate risk, these might be considered our
headline results. Notice that, comparing them with Tables 1 and 2, the effect of
randomising S depends on the damage function – the optimal controls are higher
under random S, given Weitzman or high damage, but lower given quadratic damage.
Remember that f (S) in (3) is not a mean-preserving spread around S = 3. Rather,
mean S is 2.9 and, as a distribution with a large positive skew, significantly more than
half of the probability mass lies below the mean. When one bears in mind that what
18 In line with much of the literature, we simplify the problem by omitting the possibility of learning about
the climate sensitivity from observations obtained after the first period has commenced. So the planner must
stick to optimal controls computed at the outset, a so-called open-loop control. Were it possible to learn
about climate sensitivity from observations and to change policy settings in response – a closed-loop policy –
the planner could of course achieve at least as high a level of social welfare, most probably much higher.
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ultimately matters is the pdf of consumption per capita that results from f (S), it should
start to become clear that, when the damage function has modest curvature, the effect
of randomising S on the optimal controls can be to lower them, but when the damage
function has strong curvature the opposite is true, because the tail of high
temperatures exerts an ever larger relative effect on consumption per capita, utility
and social welfare.
Figures B5 and B6 in Appendix B show the consequences of the optimal controls
for the atmospheric stock of CO2 and global mean temperature respectively.
19
Figure B5 shows that the optimal mean stock of atmospheric CO2 peaks in our
endogenous growth models at no more than about 500 ppm, and as little as 420
ppm, depending on the growth model and damage function. These stock levels are
well below those in the standard DICE model. Those combinations of growth model
Table 3
Optimal Emissions Control Rate Under Random S, 2015–2105
2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095 2105
Standard 0.158 0.184 0.211 0.240 0.270 0.302 0.335 0.370 0.407 0.446
Capital models
Quadratic damage 0.204 0.277 0.341 0.406 0.474 0.543 0.611 0.681 0.750 0.819
Weitzman damage 0.250 0.344 0.434 0.532 0.631 0.732 0.831 0.925 0.993 0.993
High damage 0.393 0.542 0.688 0.841 0.986 0.998 0.998 0.998 0.999 0.999
Productivity models
Quadratic damage 0.261 0.350 0.427 0.508 0.591 0.677 0.765 0.854 0.944 1
Weitzman damage 0.307 0.417 0.518 0.627 0.743 0.862 0.982 0.999 1 1
High damage 0.481 0.656 0.825 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4
Optimal Carbon Prices (2005 US$/tC) Under Random S, 2015–2105
2015 2025 2035 2045 2055 2065 2075 2085 2095 2105
Capital models
Quadratic damage 70 119 169 226 293 365 442 528 614 707
Weitzman damage 101 176 261 368 490 625 769 914 1019 999
High damage 229 399 598 838 1093 1092 1071 1050 1030 1010
Productivity models
Quadratic damage 110 181 253 338 435 543 664 792 930 1012
Weitzman damage 147 248 359 494 657 839 1040 1050 1032 1012
High damage 329 563 830 1146 1121 1097 1074 1053 1032 1012
19 Since the climate sensitivity is uncertain, so, obviously, is the change in the global mean temperature,
and since this goes on to affect emissions via damage, there is also some uncertainty in the longer run about
the atmospheric stock of CO2. Therefore, both figures report mean values from the Monte Carlo simulation.
In the case of the atmospheric stock of CO2, the uncertainty is very small (no more than 1 ppm), but in the
case of global mean temperature it is considerably larger. Therefore, in the latter case we also show the 90%
confidence interval, in 2205, from the Monte Carlo simulation to the right of the main chart.
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and damage function yielding higher climate impacts support a lower optimal stock.
Compared with Figure B3 we can see that the optimal stock is lower under random
S than when S = 3. Figure B6 shows that mean temperature is kept to a maximum
of around 2°C except in two cases. First, in model (1.K) with capital damage, when
the damage function is quadratic, mean warming peaks at around 2.5°C early next
century. Second, in standard DICE mean warming peaks at c. 3.5°C. Notice the
spreads around mean warming and in particular the very large 90% confidence
interval around warming in standard DICE, where the 90th percentile reaches as
much as 5.6°C. Optimal emissions controls in our extended models of DICE cut
this tail of high temperatures significantly, due to their damaging consequences in
the short and long run.
5. Conclusions
‘To slow or not to slow’ (Nordhaus, 1991) and its subsequent development into the
dynamic DICE model have given us what seems to be a coherent and powerful
framework for assessing the costs and benefits of climate-change mitigation. But it
has in-built assumptions on growth, damage and risk, which together result in gross
underassessment of the overall scale of the risks from unmanaged climate change
(Stern, 2013). This criticism applies with just as much force to most of the other
IAMs that DICE has inspired. The purpose of this article has been to show how
these unrealistic assumptions might be relaxed and what would be the conse-
quences of doing so, in terms of optimal emissions reductions and carbon prices,
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and global mean temperature.
The first assumption we have relaxed is that the underlying drivers of economic
growth are exogenous and unaffected by climate change. Instead we look at two
models of endogenous growth, in which the damage from climate change affect the
drivers of long-run growth, not just current output. The second assumption we have
relaxed is that the damage function relating instantaneous climate damage to the
increase in global mean temperature is only weakly convex. Instead, we allow for
the possibility that instantaneous damage increase rapidly, particularly once the
global mean temperature reaches 4–6°C above the pre-industrial level. We
suggest this representation is more plausible, given the scale of change that such
warming could bring; at the very least, simulations based on weak convexity should
not dominate our attention as they have come to do. The third assumption we have
relaxed is that the climatic response to greenhouse gas emissions is moderate and
moreover is precisely understood. Very few, if any, commentators would
explicitly claim that climate sensitivity is precisely understood, of course.
Nonetheless, most economic modelling is undertaken using only a single, central
estimate of the climate sensitivity parameter, fixed in the centre of the distribu-
tion of available estimates from the science. We explore risk in this crucial
parameter.
Overall, the scale of the risks from unmanaged climate change in this modelling
framework is the convolution of these three extensions. We show that, with the
models extended in this way, business-as-usual trajectories of greenhouse gas
emissions give rise to potentially large impacts on growth and prosperity in the
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future, especially after 2100. Indeed, these impacts are large enough to feed back
into future emissions via reduced activity but the feedback is too small and too late
for the system to self-regulate. Thus, optimal emissions control is strong and
strongly increasing. As a guide, we find that these models suggest the carbon price
in a setting of globally coordinated policy, such as a cap-and-trade regime or a
system of harmonised domestic carbon taxes, should be in the range $32–103/tCO2
(2012 prices) in 2015. It must be remembered that the DICE model lacks
adjustment costs, so the high end of the range should be interpreted cautiously. On
the other hand, and potentially of great importance, we have, notwithstanding our
extensions, omitted important risks in relation to the distribution of damage, which
could give higher carbon prices. Within two decades, the carbon price should rise
in real terms to $82–260/tCO2. Doing so would, according to the model, keep the
expected atmospheric stock of carbon dioxide to a maximum of c. 425–500 ppm
and the expected increase in global mean temperature to c. 1.5–2°C above pre-
industrial.
The study is only a preliminary investigation, whose purpose was to illustrate or
sketch the consequences of relaxing assumptions that have limited plausibility and
possible large effects on policy conclusions. We have, for instance, restricted our
attention to knowledge, accumulated through learning-by-doing, as the driver of
long-run growth, though other sources of growth are important and other models
might be deployed. Our exploration of the implications of risk has, for the sake of
clarity, been limited to the climate sensitivity, though other sources of great risk exist
in the physical climate system, not to mention in the economy. The models that we
do use require the choice of parameter values, about some of which there is
currently very little relevant empirical evidence. Given slow rates of learning about
some IAM parameters, this should be regarded as an endemic problem, however
(Pindyck, 2013). It is not the case that the standard model parameters are well
constrained, whereas the new parameters we introduce are not. Future work building
on our framework should also pay attention to the costs of rapid adjustment to a low-
carbon economy and possible limits to the speed of decarbonisation. This work will
need to go well beyond the choice of parameter values to consider new model
structures.
This is not an article about the sensitivity of results to pure-time discounting, or
other parameters and structures relevant to discounting. As we found in the
technical Appendix to Stern (2007) and in Dietz et al. (2007a,c), lower pure-time
discounting does indeed favour stronger and earlier action to curb emissions. Those
results were from the ‘PAGE’ IAM (Hope, 2006) but we know from other work that
this is also true of DICE (Nordhaus, 2007). We have argued elsewhere that careful
scrutiny of the ethical issues around pure-time discounting points to lower values
than are commonly assumed (usually with little serious discussion). Pure-time
discounting is essentially discrimination by date of birth in the sense that a life,
which is identical in all respects (including time patterns of consumption) but
happens to start later, has a lower value. If, for example, the pure-time discount
rate were 2%, a life starting 35 years later, but otherwise the same, would have half
the value of a life starting now. The time horizon essential to a discussion of
climate change makes careful examination of these ethical issues unavoidable.
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Preliminary calculations indicate that low pure-time discounting will significantly
increase the optimal controls in this article as well.
One cannot and should not expect a single model to capture all relevant issues and
neither should we be able to resolve all difficulties within a single framework.20 It is
enough for a model to help raise and understand key aspects of a problem. This means
that we should be grateful to Bill Nordhaus for providing one helpful vehicle. As it is
expanded and different perspectives are brought in, including the possibility of major
loss of life from climate change, then we would suggest the arguments for strong action
will look still stronger.
Appendix A. Extended Model Description
Here, we offer an extended description of the DICE model, focusing on the major model
equations and in particular on our modifications. Even more detail can be found on Nordhaus’s
model website at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/index.html. Our analysis is
based on the 2010 version of the model.
The model represents a social planner maximising a classical utilitarian objective functional by
choosing the rate of control of industrial carbon dioxide emissions:
max
fltg
Tmax
t¼1
W ¼
XTmax
t¼0
uðctÞLtð1þ qÞ
t ;
where l 2 [0, 1] is the emissions control rate, u(ct) is the instantaneous social utility of
consumption per capita at time t and q = 0.015 is the utility discount rate. Note that c is not only
time-dependent as the above equation implies, it is also state-dependent when we undertake
stochastic modelling. We suppress notation of state-dependence for simplicity; bear in mind that,
when running the model with a random parameter (the climate sensitivity S in (3)), we take the
expectation of social welfare. Tmax is the terminal period, which is 2595. The model proceeds in
time steps of ten years from 2005, so appropriate interpretations must be made in considering
the various equations of motion. Notice that, since 2005 is in the past, our first control period is
t = 1, i.e. 2015.21
The utility function is iso-elastic,
uðctÞ ¼
c1gt
1 g
;
where g is the elasticity of marginal social utility of consumption and is set to 1.5 to allow
comparison with standard DICE.
As set out in the main body of the article, we explore two alternative production functions:
Yt ¼ ð1 D
Y
t Þð1 KtÞAtK
aþb
t L
1a
t ; (1.K)
Yt ¼ ð1 D
Y
t Þð1 KtÞ
AtK
a
t L
1a
t : (1.TFP)
20 For example, the paradoxes of social choice theory can be better understood by broadening the
philosophical perspective and are not easily resolved within the standard framework (Sen, 2009).
21 In fact, we need only solve lt from 2015 to 2245 inclusive, since DICE assumes that from 2255 onwards
lt = 1, because a zero-emissions backstop energy technology becomes competitive.
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The capital elasticity a = 0.3, while the elasticity of output with respect to knowledge, b = 0.3
(Mankiw et al., 1995).
The equation of motion of capital in model (1.K) is
Ktþ1 ¼ ð1 D
K
t Þð1 d
K ÞKt þ It ;
where dK = 0.1, while in model (1.TFP) we simply drop (1DK ).
Output is either consumed or invested,
Yt ¼ Ct þ It
where Ct = ctLt is aggregate consumption and It = sYt, where s = 0.23 is the savings rate
(calibrated to long-run average optimal savings in standard DICE, without climate damage and
emissions abatement costs and, in principle, some private inter-temporal objectives). We specify
exogenous, constant savings in order to capture in a simple way the second-best context implied
by fitting our models of endogenous growth to current macroeconomic data. In growth models
with knowledge spillovers, the savings rate chosen by a planner will be greater than the savings
rate emerging from a decentralised equilibrium of firms and households, because the marginal
private return to investment does not include the spillovers.
A more elaborate analysis would permit households to choose their optimal savings rate in
equilibrium with firms’ private marginal product of capital (in response to the planner’s
emissions controls), but it is worth noting that, in standard DICE, endogenising the savings rate
has been shown to make little difference to the optimal policy (Fankhauser and Tol, 2005; and
Nordhaus’s laboratory notes on DICE), so our simplification is unlikely to matter.22 In any case,
whether households are currently taking into account the effects of climate policy on future
consumption prospects when choosing how much to save is unclear.
In model (1.TFP), productivity is endogenous and its equation of motion is
Atþ1 ¼ ð1 D
A
t Þð1 d
AÞ At þ c1I
c2
t ; (3)
where dA = 0.01 is the rate of depreciation of the stock of TFP, while c1  0.0003 and
c2  0:373 are parameters of the spillovers function. c1 and c2 are calibrated so that output
in (1.TFP), in the absence of climate damage and emissions abatement costs, is the
same as in standard DICE. In model (1.K), TFP is an exogenous time series, so (3) does not
apply.
The climate damage function is
Dt ¼ 1 1=ð1þ p1Tt þ p2T
2
t þ p3T
6:754
t Þ; (4’)
where p1 = 0 and p2  0.00284 throughout. p3 = 0 when we compute results for the standard
setting (i.e. Dt ¼ D^t),  5.07 9 10
6 when we use Weitzman’s parameterisation, or
 8.199105 according to our high damage specification, where Dt is assumed to be equal to
0.5 when the atmospheric temperature is 4°C above the pre-industrial level.
Damage is then partitioned between output and capital, or output and TFP, depending on the
growth model:
Dit ¼ f
i  Dt ;
DYt ¼ 1
ð1 DtÞ
ð1 Dit Þ
22 See also Mirrlees and Stern (1972), who first illustrated this feature in simple optimal growth models.
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where f is the share of damage to i = A or i = K. IAMs do not in general explicitly address the
allocation of damage between capital and output, and vary widely in what they implicitly assume
about it. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) analysis might be read to suggest that f K is in the region of
1/3, so 0.3 is the value we choose. The calibration problem is even more acute in the case of
allocating damage between output and TFP – there are, as Moyer et al. (forthcoming) also point
out, currently severe modelling, data and estimation problems in carrying out such an allocation.
Moyer et al. (forthcoming) consequently explore a range of values of f A between 1% and 100%.
We make the relatively conservative assumption that f A = 0.05.
The total abatement cost function is
Kt ¼ h1;tl
h2
t ;
where h1,t is a time-varying coefficient and h2 ¼ 2:8, hence marginal abatement costs are
increasing in emissions control.
Cumulative industrial carbon dioxide emissions are constrained by remaining fossil fuel
reserves,
XTmax
t¼0
EINDt CCum;
where C Cum = 6000 gigatonnes of carbon is the constraint, and total emissions of carbon are
the sum of industrial emissions of carbon dioxide and exogenous emissions of carbon dioxide
from land use:
Et ¼ E
IND
t þ E
LAND
t :
Industrial carbon dioxide emissions at time t are proportional to gross output in the same
period, hence there is a different function depending on the growth model:
EINDt ¼ rtð1 ltÞAtK
aþb
t L
1a
t ; or
¼ rtð1 ltÞ AtK
a
t L
1a
t ;
where rt is the ratio of uncontrolled emissions to output and is an exogenous, time-varying
coefficient. It is assumed that ∂r/∂t < 0, representing autonomous improvements in carbon
productivity that arise from technical progress and structural change, and that ∂2r/∂t2 > 0.
The atmospheric stock of carbon is driven by total emissions, in a system of three equations
representing the cycling of carbon between three reservoirs, the atmosphere MAT, a quickly
mixing reservoir comprising the upper ocean and parts of the biosphere MUP, and the lower
ocean MLO:
MATt ¼ Et þ /11M
AT
t1 þ /21M
UP
t1
MUPt ¼ /12M
AT
t1 þ /22M
UP
t1 þ /32M
LO
t1
MLOt ¼ /23M
UP
t1 þ /33M
LO
t1:
Cycling is determined by a set of coefficients /jk that govern the rate of transport from
reservoir j to k per unit of time.
The change in the atmospheric stock of carbon from the pre-industrial level determines
radiative forcing,
Ft ¼ F2CO2  log2
MATt
dMAT
 
þ F EXt ;
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where dMAT is the stock of carbon in the atmosphere before the industrial revolution (i.e. in
1750) and F EXt is exogenous radiative forcing (capturing among other things the forcing due to
greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide) and is time-dependent. The equation of motion of
temperature is given by:
Tt ¼ Tt1 þ j1 Ft 
F2CO2
S
Tt1ð Þ  j2 Tt1  T
LO
t1
 
 
; (5)
where T LO is the temperature of the lower oceans and evolves according to:
T LOt ¼ T
LO
t1 þ j3 Tt1  T
LO
t1
 
:
Appendix B. Further Results
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© 2015 The Authors.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Royal Economic Society.
2015] G ROWTH , CON V E X D AMAG E S A N D C L I M A T E R I S K 595
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
2000 2050 2100 2150 2200
TFP Model
2000 2050 2100 2150 2200
K Model
s = 6
Standard
s = 3
s = 3, High Damage
s = 1.5
A
tm
os
ph
er
ic
 T
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 (D
eg
re
es
 C
el
siu
s  
A
bo
v
e 
Pr
e-
in
du
str
ia
l)
A
tm
os
ph
er
ic
 T
em
pe
ra
tu
re
 (D
eg
re
es
 C
el
siu
s  
A
bo
v
e 
Pr
e-
in
du
str
ia
l)
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TO SLOW OR NOT TO SLOW: THE ECONOMICS OF 
THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT 
William D. Nordhaus 
I. INTRODUCTION1 
Over the last decade, scientists have studied extensively the greenhouse effect, 
which holds that the accumulation of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other 
greenhouse gases (GHGs) is expected to produce global warming and other 
significant climatic changes over the next century. Along with the scientific 
research have come growing alarm and calls for drastic curbs on the emissions 
of greenhouse gases, as for example the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC [I990]) and the Second World Climate Conference 
(October I990). To date, these call to arms for forceful measures to slow 
greenhouse warming have been made without any serious attempt to weigh the 
costs and benefits of climatic change or alternative control strategies. 
The present study presents a simple approach for analyzing policies to slow 
climate change. We begin by summarizing the elements of an economic 
analysis of different approaches to controlling greenhouse warming. We then 
sketch a mathematical model of economic growth that links the economy, 
emissions, and climate changes and summarize the empirical evidence on the 
costs of reducing emissions and concentrations of greenhouse gases and on the 
damages from greenhouse warming, relying primarily on data for the United 
States. The different sections are then integrated to provide estimates of the 
efficient reduction of greenhouse gases, after which the final section summarizes 
the major results. 
II. CLIMATE CHANGE: SCIENCE AND ECONOMIC MODELLING 
In weighing climate-change policies, the prospects for global warming and the 
linkage between human activities and the emissions of GHGs form a key 
building block. This study uses a simplified analytical structure. We have taken 
existing models and simplified them into a few equations that are easily 
understood and manipulated. 
The scientific basis of the greenhouse effect has been described in the 
preceding paper by Cline.2 As a result of the buildup of a number of GHGs, it 
is expected that significant climate changes will occur over the next century 
and beyond. The major GHGs are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides, 
and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Table I shows the important greenhouse 
' This paper is a revision of earlier versions (see Nordhaus [1 989]), and the author is grateful for insightful 
comments oni early drafts from many people, with particular thanks to Jesse Ausubel, Alan Manne, 
James Sweeney, and an anon-ymous referee. This research was supported in part by the National Science 
Foundation. 
2 Excellent nontechnical discussions are also contained in National Research Council (I987), Schneider 
(I989), and IPCC (Igg9). 
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Table I 
Estimated contribution of different greenhouse gases to global warming mid-i986s 
Relative contribution 
Instantaneous Total 
Greenhouse gas (%o) (%o) Source of emission 
C02 53.2 80.3 Largely from combustion of fossil fuels 
Methane I 73 2-2 Poorly known. From a wide variety of biological and 
agricultural activities 
CFC- ii and I 2 2I'4 8'8 Wholly industrial, from both aerosols and non- 
aerosols. Being phased out 
Nitrous oxides 8'I 8'7 From fertilisers and energy use 
Source: Emissions from EPA (I989), vol. i. Definition of instantaneous and total in text. Estimates of the 
ratio of total warming potential to instantaneous warming potential from Lashof and Ahuja (I99I), with 
calculations and data explained in Nordhaus (I990). Uses zero discount rate on future warming. 
gases along with the sources of emissions and estimates of their contribution 
to global warming. Current reviews suggest that a doubling of C02 or its 
radiative equivalent, will in equilibrium increase global mean surface 
temperature by I' to 5 'C.' 
A complication in studying climate change arises from the multitude. of 
GHGs. In the analysis that follows, we translate each of the GHGs into its CO2 
equivalent. We also use a measure of the total warming potential, which is the 
contribution of a GHG to global warming summed over the indefinite future. 
A complete dynamic analysis would also incorporate discounting to take into 
account that the cost of warming is different depending upon the time at which 
the warming occurs, but this complication is of second-order importance and 
is ignored here. 
Table I shows a comparison of the instantaneous (i.e. the relative impact 
upon warming per unit of concentration) and total warming potential of major 
GHGs in the mid-ig8os.4 This shows the dominance of CO2 in long-term 
warming from GHG emissions over the next century. Table 2 shows the 
estimates of C02-equivalent emissions of each of the major GHGs in I 985. The 
first column (production or emissions) shows the C02 equivalent of the total 
production or gross emissions in i985, while the second column (emissions 
weighted by change in concentrations) reflects the fact that the increase in 
atmospheric concentrations is less than production or emissions. For both 
estimates, CO2 is approximately 8o percent of the total global C02-equivalent 
emissions of around 8 billion tons. In this study, we measure C02 in terms of 
its carbon content. The ratio of CO2 weight to carbon weight is 
(12+ ?6+ I6)/I2 = 3167. 
A final element in estimating the climatic impact of rising GHGs involves the 
time delay in the reaction of climate to increasing atmospheric concentrations. 
3 The sources of uncertainty about future climate change focussing on CO2 are systematically analysed 
in Nordhaus and Yohe (I983). 
4 A non-technical discussion is provided in Nordhaus (I990). The estimates used here rely on the more 
complete analysis of Lashof and Ahuja (i 9i). 
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Table 2 
C02-equivalent emissions 1985 (millions of metric tons, carbon content of CO2 per 
year, total warming potential) 
Emission Concentration 
weights weights 
Carbon dioxide 6500 6500 
Methane 6I2 I8I 
Nitrogen oxides 549 703 
Chlorofluorocarbons 26i 714 
Total, CO2 equivalent 7922 8098 
Source: Emissions and changes in concentrations are from EPA (i989). Estimates of total warming 
potential are described in text and use a zero discount rate. 
The average climate responds slowly to increases in radiative inputs, chiefly 
because of the thermal inertia of the oceans. Estimates of the delay to 
equilibrium range from 6 to 95 years. In the model used here, we simplify by 
assuming that the temperature adjustment process takes the following form: 
T(t) = f{g[AMi(t)] - T(t)} (I) 
M(t) = /E(t)-6'M(t) (2) 
where dots over variable repiZesent time derivatives and t = time 
T(t) = increase in global mean surface temperature due to greenhouse 
warming since mid- i gth century (?C) 
M(t) = anthropogenic atmospheric concentration of CO2 equivalent GHGs 
(billions of tons of CO2 equivalent) 
E(t) = anthropogenic emissions of CO2 equivalent GHGs (billions of tons of 
CO2 equivalent per year) 
g[.] = equilibrium increase in global mean temperature in response to 
increasing CO2 equivalent concentration 
a = delay parameter of temperature in response to radiative increase 
(per year) 
,f = fraction of CO2 equivalent emissions that enter the atmosphere 
8 = rate of removal of CO2 equivalent from the atmosphere (per year) 
The interpretation of these equations is as follows. Equation (i) states that 
the increase in global temperature rises in response to the difference between 
the equilibrium temperature increase and the actual increase. Equation (2) iS 
a simplified two-box diffusion model in which a fraction /l of emissions goes into 
the atmosphere and the fraction 8 of the quantity in the atmosphere diffuses 
into the deep ocean, which is a very large sink for CO2. 
We estimate the climate-equation parameters from existing climate models. 
Hansen estimates a time delay parameter (a), of o OI8I for a box-diffusion 
ocean model with a temperature-CO2 coefficient of 3 0C per doubling, while 
calculations by Stouffer et al. in a coupled atmosphere-deep ocean model 
(I990) have a time delay parameter of O-OI3. These are slightly lower than 
other estimates and we use a = 002 in our calculations. For the factor , (the 
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airborne fraction of GHGs), we estimated the equation with ordinary least 
squares using data on concentrations and emissions of CO2 from I850 to I986. 
We use the conventional estimate for 8 of o oos (representing a residence time 
of 200 years), and estimate 8 to be 0o49 with a standard error of O-OI25. We 
round this to ,1 = 0o50 for the calculations that follow. 
III. ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO CONTROL OF THE GREENHOUSE 
EFFECT 
The economics of the greenhouse effect is a classic case of a public good, in 
which emissions of GHGs involve a global externality. We can analyse the costs 
and benefits of the greenhouse effect and policies in terms of two fundamental 
functions. The greenhouse damage function describes the costs to society of the 
changing climate. This damage function would incorporate, for example, the 
impact of changing crop yields, land lost to oceans, and so forth. The abatement 
cost function describes the costs that the economy undergoes to prevent or slow 
the greenhouse effect. The cost function would include the cost of changing 
from fossil to non-fossil fuels, the substitution of different substances for CFCs, 
raising coastal structures, and so on. 
In what follows, we will concentrate upon efficient strategies to reduce the 
costs of climate change. An efficient strategy is one that maximises overall net 
economic welfare (call it 'green GNP'), which includes all goods and services, 
whether or not they are metered by markets, and includes all externalities from 
economic activity. 
Figure I depicts the analysis graphically in a static framework. The upward 
sloping curve is the efficient marginal cost of abatement function, showing the 
incremental cost of reducing CO2 or other GHGs by one unit. The wavy line 
is the marginal damage from greenhouse warming associated with an additional 
unit of GHGs. The horizontal axis measures GHG emissions as a percent of the 
uncontrolled quantity. This variable has a value of o?/ when GHGs are 
uncontrolled (i.e. in an unregulated environment). We can derive from 
economic theory certain properties about the shape of the marginal abatement 
cost function in a competitive economy with no other externalities and where 
controls are efficiently designed. First, we know that it has a minimum of zero 
at the uncontrolled point: The first units of GHG reduction are virtually free. This 
is the result of the zero market price on the GHG emissions. Second, we know that the 
cost function increases in the level of abatement. Third, society can always do 
worse than the abatement cost function by inefficiently designing regulations. 
Next examine the greenhouse damage function, which measures the cost to 
the economy of higher levels of GHGs (measured relative to some baseline). In 
contrast to the cost function, we know little about the shape of the damage 
function - for this reason, we draw the damage function as a wavy line. We 
suspect that higher levels of greenhouse gases will hurt the global economy, but 
because of the fertilization effect of CO2 or the attractiveness of warm climates, 
the greenhouse effect might on balance actually be economically advantageous. 
Figure I uses the marginal cost and damage concepts to describe different 
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Fig. i. Marginal costs of GHG reductions and marginal damage from GHG emissions. 
policies along with their costs and benefits. We can measure the total cost of an 
uncontrolled greenhouse effect as the area under the damage curve over the 
entire range [o, i oo]; this area is the sum of regions A + B + C in Figure I. 
Reducing GHG levels by one unit from the laissez-faire point Z produces a net 
gain equal to the reduction of damage of amount Z minus the increase of cost 
of zero. The efficient level of control is at point E, where the marginal cost of 
abatement equals the marginal damage of emissions. Relative to the laissez- 
faire equilibrium, the damages at the optimal-control point E have been 
reduced by the sum of areas B + C, while the increased abatement costs are 
given by B, so the net economic gain is given by the area C. 
IV. MODELLING OF ECONOMIC AND CLIMATIC DYNAMICS 
Because greenhouse policies involve investing today to reduce damages in the 
distant future, we present a stylised model of the relationship between 
economic growth and climate change that incorporates the dynamics of climate 
change and of investing in slowing climate change. The model includes three 
components: (I) a simplified model of the cycle of greenhouse gases; (2) an 
economic model that incorporates the tradeoffs involved in reducing 
greenhouse gases; and (3) a framework for describing how society chooses 
between alternative consumption paths. 
Following Section II's analysis, it will be convenient to linearise equation (I) 
as follows: 
T(t) = c{1xM(t) - T(t)} (3) 
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where all variables were defined above except for ,u, which is the linearised 
equilibrium sensitivity of temperature to concentrations of C02-equivalent 
emissions (i.e., g'(M) = ,u). 
In examining the economics of greenhouse warming, we rely upon a simple 
general equilibrium model of inputs, outputs, climate, emissions, and 
consumption. We study the impact of policies upon an economy in the middle 
of the next century. The key assumption is that the economy is in resource steady- 
state. This signifies that all physical flows in the global economy are constant 
although the real value of economic activity may be increasing. All emissions 
and concentrations of greenhouse gases are therefore constant, and the climatic 
impacts of industrial activity have stabilised. We allow for 'balanced resource- 
augmenting technological change' at rate h; that is, the useful goods and 
services produced by the economy will be assumed to grow uniformly in each 
sector even though the physical throughputs are constant. 
In the steady state, per capita consumption is given by 
c(t) = y*eht{g[E*] - 5 [T*]}. (4) 
In this equation, the new variables are c(t) = per capita consumption at timne 
t; y* is a constant; y(t) = y*eht - output before any emissions reduction and 
with no climate damage; E* = steady-state emissions; T* = steady-state 
temperature increase; g(E*) = steady state cost function from reduction of 
emissions; and qO(T*) = steady state damage from climate change. The 
production function is undated to indicate that we are considering a resource 
steady-state. 
We assume that it is desirable to maximize a social welfare function that is 
the discounted sum of the utilities of per capita consumption. An optimal 
program for allocating resources over time maximizes the following: 
V= u[c(t)] e-P dt. (5) 
The fundamental policy question involves how much reduction in consumption 
society should incur today to slow the consumption damages from climate 
change in the future. 
The clhoice of discount rate is a thorny issue in studies of investment, and this 
is particularly the case for investments over a century or more. Assuming that 
the rate of return on investment has been determined appropriately, in our 
resource steady-state, the real discount rate on goods will be given by 
r = p +? h, where p = the pure rate of social time preference, - = the 
elasticity of the marginal utility with respect to per capita consumption, and h 
is the growth rate of per capita consumption. In the model used here, the 
critical parameter is r-h, which is the difference between the discount rate on 
goods and the growth rate of the economy. This will be relevant because, while 
we discount future damages at r, in our resource steady state the damages 
will be growing at the rate of economic growth (h). With slow economic growth 
(h near zero), or with a utility function close to logarithmic (o near i), r-h will 
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be close to the pure rate of time preference. In advanced countries today, the 
real rate of return on capital is estimated to be between 4 and i 00% per year 
while the growth of real output is around 3 0 per year, so r-h is between i and 
7 0 per year. In the calculations that follow, we use estimates of (r-h) that are 
very low (either o or i % per year) to reflect the possibility that the future 
equilibrium will come in a low- or no-growth economy with a low rate of time 
preference; and a case of r - h = 400 per year estimate to reflect the 
approximate real rate of return in advanced economies today. 
To calculate the optimal level of emissions reduction we perform a 
variational experiment. Starting from the resource steady state, consider a one- 
shot increase in emissions by AE in period o. This will lead to an increase in 
concentrations in the future by flAEe-t. In our stylised economy-climate 
system, this will lead to an increase in temperature of 
A T(t) = AE/fla [e-t-e-et] / (a-'8) (6) 
The present and future impact upon consumption is given by: 
y *g'(E*) AE, for t = o AC (t) = (7i) 
-y*ehN/ (T*) AT(t) fort> o 
where y*g'(E*) AE is the increase in consumption from allowing higher 
emissions at time o and y*ehtqs/(T*)AT(t) is the damage from the higher 
concentrations of GHGs in the future. Starting from the reference path that is 
a resource steady state, with r-h > o, if the original path was optimal, the 
present value of the change in the emissions path should be zero for small 
variations. This implies: 
00 
y*g'(E *) AE = { [y*ehtq O(T*) A T(t)] e-rtdt 
Using (6), some manipulation will show that this reduces to 
g'(E*) = j/3q0'(T*) a[i/(r+?-h) - i/(r+a-h)]/(a-8) (8) 
or 
g'(E*)=A ' T *) r' (g) 
where F = the present-value factor = a/ [ (r + 8-h) (r + d-h) ]. Equations (8) 
and (g) state that the optimal degree of reduction of GHGs comes where 
the current cost of reducing GHG emissions equals the present value of the 
damage from higher concentrations. F can be interpreted as the number of 
years, in present value, of equilibrium-CO2-doubling climate damage, which 
occurs when a one-shot concentration increase, equal to the initial CO2 
concentration, occurs at time zero. For example, say that a doubling of CO2 in 
equilibrium reduces world output by I %. Then a CO2 emission equal to the 
initial concentration would produce impacts over the indefinite future whose 
present value is equal to F percent of world output. Column (2) of Table 3 
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Table 3 
Value of present-value factor, and present value of C02 emissions 
( I ) ~~(2) (3) (4) (5) 
Difference 
between real Present value of climate damages from C02-equivalent 
interest rate on emissions (I989 $ per ton CO2 equivalent, carbon 
goods and growth weight) for damages as percentage of world output 
rate (r-h), Present-value [4u0`'(T*) r] 
% per year factor (r) 2 I4 
$ $ $ 
0 200'0 65.94 32.97 8'24 
I 444 I4'65 733 183 
4 74I 2'44 I'22 03I 
Note: For these calculations, we assume that the lag of temperature behind GHG concentrations is 
a = 0'02 (for a mean lag of 50 years), and that the rate of disappearance of GHGs is 0o005 per year (for an 
atmospheric residence time of 200 years). 
Present-value factor in column (2) is defined in the text. Calculation of present value of climate damages 
is defined in the text (Section VI) and is made as follows: Damage is percent of output per year, where I989 
world output is equal to $20,000 billion US dollars. Total CO2 equivalent emissions in I989 are estimated 
to be 8'o billion metric tons of CO2, carbon weight. Therefore the total damage is the present value factor 
from column (2) times the damage in the upper column divided by initial value of atmospheric 
concentrations, measured in present value of future damages per ton CO2 equivalent emission. 
shows numerical values of the present-value factor F for different values of the 
underlying parameters. To find the efficient or optimal amount of reduction of 
GHGs, we return to equation (9), which shows that the optimal degree of 
steady-state control comes where g'(E*) = jt/30'( T*) F. 
V. EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES OF THE COSTS OF SLOWING WARMING 
This section presents the estimates of the costs of GHG reduction while the next 
estimates the damages that may arise from warming. The experiment that is 
conducted below examines a 'snapshot' of emissions, concentrations, and 
economic costs and damages at a point in time.5 They are then converted into 
the relevant economic magnitudes using the tools introduced in the last section. 
More precisely, for impacts we examine the consequences of doubling of the 
C02-equivalent concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere. For the costs we 
estimate the costs of reducing the emissions of CO2 in today's economy. The 
rationale for these two snapshots is that the lag of impacts behind emissions is 
in the order of 30 to 8o years, so we need to understand the impacts in the future 
of changes in GHG emissions today. 
Clearly, this economic calculation is oversimplified. First, it abstracts from 
the intricate economic and climatic dynamics by considering the resource 
steady state in which the economy is growing while the physical flows are 
remaining constant. Second, in extrapolating the sectoral composition of the 
United States economy, there are two problems with opposite signs. On the one 
5 A preliminary analysis of a non-steady-state trajectory incorporating several regions and growth of 
emissions is contained in Nordhaus (iggoa). 
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Table 4 
Alternative responses to the threat of greenhouse warming 
I. Slow or prevent greenhouse warming: reduce emissions and concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
Reduce energy consumption 
Reduce GHG emissions per unit of energy consumption or GNP 
Shift to low-CO2 fuels 
Divert CO2 from entering atmosphere 
Shift to substitutes for CFCs 
Remove greenhouse gases from atmosphere 
Grow and pickle trees 
2. Offset climatic effects. 
Climatic engineering 
-Shoot particles into the stratosphere 
Fertilise the ocean with trace iron 
3. Adapt to warmer climate. 
Decentralised/market adaptations 
Movement of population and capital to new temperate zones 
Corn belt migrates toward Canada and Siberia 
Central/governmental policies 
Build dikes to prevent ocean's invasion 
Land-use regulations 
Research on drought-tolerant crops 
hand, the sectoral composition of developing countries is generally more 
resource-intensive than the-United States; on the other hand, during the 
process of economic growth economies tend to become less resource intensive. 
The net effect of these two forces is unclear. Third, the calculations omit other 
potential market failures, such as ozone depletion or air pollution; these 
complementary market failures are particularly important for the CFCs, which 
have already been severely curbed for reasons unrelated to greenhouse 
warming. While these oversimplifications are necessary at this stage, they have 
the virtue of allowing greater transparency than would be possible in a model 
with full spatial and temporal resolution. 
How can nations cope with the threat of greenhouse warming? Table 4 lays 
out some of the options. A first option, taking preventive policies to slow or 
prevent greenhouse warming, has received the greatest public attention. Most 
policy discussion has focussed on reducing energy consumption or switching to 
non-fossil fuels. A second option is to offset the climatic warming through 
climatic engineering. Among recent proposals are putting trace iron in the 
North Pacific and Antarctic oceans and shooting particulate matter into the 
stratosphere. One estimate finds that ioo,ooo kilograms of carbon can be offset 
by I kilogram of particles. Careful analysis of these proposals is only just 
beginning, but a number of cost-effective ones have already been identified. A 
final option is to adapt to the warmer climate. This could take place gradually 
on a decentralized basis through the automatic response of people, institutions, 
and markets as the climate warms and the oceans rise. If particular areas 
become unproductive, labour and capital would migrate to more productive 
regions. If sea level rises, settlements would gradually retreat upland unless 
protected. In addition, governments could take steps to pre-empt possible 
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harmful climatic impacts by land-use regulations or investing in research on 
living in a warmer climate. 
In what follows, I will examine mainly the first strategy, slowing greenhouse 
warming through reduction of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. 
This option is most relevant for policy because preventive steps must be taken 
today while adaptive steps and climate engineering can be taken later as 
climate changes. Clearly, a complete policy analysis would need to investigate 
the entire range of responses. 
There are numerous estimates of the cost of reducing GHGs, and for this 
purpose I present the results of a recent survey.' This survey examines the cost 
of GHG reductions through three of the most discussed and significant 
strategies: (i) reducing CFC emissions, (2) reducing CO2 emissions, and (3) 
increasing the carbon locked up in trees. 
There are at this time more than a dozen different estimates of the costs of 
reducing CO2. These often differ by a factor of two or three, although the 
general shapes of the cost curves are similar. The costs of CFC reduction are 
not terribly controversial. By contrast, the estimates of reforestation options 
are highly controversial and not well documented. In addition, a number of 
other possible options, such as treatment of methane-producing ruminants or 
rice paddies, are ignored here. 
We show in Figure 2 the estimates of the marginal cost curve for each option 
and a total marginal cost curve for reducing GHGs. The curve marked 
'Marginal cost: All GHGs'in Figure 2 is calculated as the (efficient) marginal 
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Fig. 2. Marginal and total costs of GHG reduction. 
6 See Nordhaus (i99i). 
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cost curve of all options. We also show the same result in terms of the total global 
cost of GHG reduction (in billions of I989 dollars at the I989 level of world 
economic activity) for different levels of reduction of GHG emissions. Columns 
(2) and (3) of Table 7 show our estimates of the marginal and total costs of 
reducing GHGs. These suggest that a modest reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions can be obtained at low cost. After I O % reduction, however, the curve 
rises as more costly measures are required. A 50 0 reduction in GHG emissions 
is estimated to cost almost $2oo billion per year in today's economy, or around 
I % of world output. This estimate is understated to the extent that the 
implementing policies are inefficient or that they are implemented in a crash 
program. 
VI. ESTIMATING THE DAMAGES FROM GREENHOUSE WARMING 
We now move from the terra infirma of climate change to the terra incognita of the 
social and economic impacts of climate change. Studies of the impacts of 
climate change are in their infancy, and at this stage we can only hope to obtain 
an order-of-magnitude estimate of impact of greenhouse warming upon the 
global economy. Before presenting the estimates, two points should be noted. 
First, it must be recognised that human societies thrive in a wide variety of 
climatic zones. For the bulk'of economic activity, non-climate variables like 
labour skills, access to markets, or technology swamp climatic considerations in 
determining economic efficiency. Second, although this analysis focuses 
primarily upon globally averaged surface temperature, this variable is chosen 
because it is a useful index (in the nature of a sufficient statistic) of climate 
change that tends to be associated with most other important changes rather 
than because it is the most important factor in determining impacts. 
Table 5 shows a sectoral breakdown of United States national income, where 
the economy is subdivided by the sectoral sensitivity to greenhouse warming. 
The most sensitive sectors are likely to be those, such as agriculture and 
forestry, in which output depends in a significant way upon climatic variables. 
At the other extreme are activities, such as cardiovascular surgery or 
microprocessor fabrication in 'clean rooms', which are undertaken in carefully 
controlled environments that will not be directly affected by climate change. 
Our estimate is that approximately 3 0 of United States national output is 
produced in highly sensitive sectors, another I 00% in moderately sensitive 
sectors, and about 87 % in sectors that are negligibly affected by climate 
change. In the damage estimates that follow, we will make the simplifying 
assumption that the damage applies to world GNP in 2050, and that the 
composition of 2050 world GNP is the same as United States GNP in I98I. 
Table 6 presents a rough set of estimates of the impact of greenhouse warming 
upon United States national income. The major findings are: 
C] Most studies suggest that greenhouse warming will lower yields in 
agriculture. This impact is, however, offset by the fertilisation effect of higher 
levels of CO An assessment in the EPA report (I988) finds an overall impact 
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Table 5 
Breakdown of economic activity by vulnerability to climatic change, U.S. i981 
National income 
Value Percentage 
Sector (billions) of total 
Total national income 24I51 II00 0 
Potentially severely impacted 
Farms 671 I 2-8 
Forestry, fisheries, other 77 0-3 
Moderate potential impact 
Construction 1091I 4 5 
Water transportation 6-3 0-3 
Energy and utilities 
Energy (electric, gas, oil) 45e9 19 
Water and sanitary 5e7 0e2 
Real estate 
Land-rent component 5I12 21I 
Hotels, lodging, recreation 25e4 III 
Negligible effect 
Manufacturing and mining 627e4 260o 
Other transportation and communication I32e6 5e5 
Finance, insurance, and balance real estate 274e8 II14 
Trade and other services 674e6 27e9 
Government services 337e0 I40 
Rest of world 50'3 21I 
Sources and notes: Data are based on the United States National Accounts, Survey of Current Business, 
July I 984. 
on all crops for the United States is plus or minus $io billion, with the 
difference between these estimates arising from the magnitude of the climate 
change. 
EII There is great uncertainty about the impact of climate change upon sea- 
level change. Recent scientific views are in the range of 30 to 6o cm over the 
next century. EPA (i988) estimates the cost of a 50 cm sea-level rise for the 
United States will fall in three categories: land loss of around 4000 square 
miles, protection costs (by levees and dikes) of high-value property, and 
miscellaneous protection of open coasts. The total capital value is in the order 
of $5o billion, which is approximately 0-05 % of projected cumulative gross 
private domestic investment over the period I985-2050. 
C1 Many other sectors are likely to be affected, although numerical 
estimates of the effects are incomplete. Greenhouse warming will increase the 
demand for space cooling and decrease the demand for space heating, with but 
a small net impact on the energy sector. The forest products industry may 
benefit from CO2 fertilisation. Water systems (such as runoff in rivers or the 
length of ice-free periods) may be significantly affected, but the costs are likely 
to be determined more by the rate of climate change than the new equilibrium 
climate. Construction in temperate climates will be favourably affected 
because of a longer period of warm weather. For recreation and water 
transportation, the outlook is mixed depending upon the initial climate. Cold 
32-2 
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regions may gain while hot regions may lose; investments in water skiing will 
appreciate while those in snow skiing will depreciate. But for the bulk of the 
economy - manufacturing, mining, utilities, finance, trade, and most service 
industries - it is difficult to find major direct impacts of the projected climate 
changes over the next 50 to 75 years. 
D: A wide variety of non-marketed goods and services escape the net of the 
national income accounts and might affect the calculations. Among the areas 
of importance are human health, biological diversity, amenity values of 
everyday life and leisure, and environmental quality. I am aware of no studies 
that point to major costs, but further analysis will be required to determine 
whether these omitted sectors will significantly affect the assessment of the cost 
of greenhouse warming. An important area for future research is to use broader 
measures of national output, such as those in Nordhaus and Tobin (I972) and 
Eisner (I985), to determine whether the conclusions for the market sector 
would be modified. One particular area of importance is the amenities of 
everyday life; one thorough study suggests major amenity benefits from gi,pbal 
warming. 
The overall assessment of the cost of greenhouse warming in the United 
States is shown in the bottom of Table 6. We estimate that the net economic 
Table 6 
Impact estimates for different sectors, for doubling of C02, U.S. (positive number 
indicates gain; negative number loss) 
Sectors Billions (I98I $) 
Severely impacted sectors 
Farms 
Impact of greenhouse warming and CO2 fertilisation -io-6 to +9 7 
Forestry, fisheries, other Small + or - 
Moderately impacted sectors 
Construction + 
Water transportation ? 
Energy and utilities 
Energy (electric, gas, oil) 
Electricity demand - I-65 
Non-electric space heating i-i6 
Water and sanitary -? 
Real estate 
Land-rent component 
Estimate of damage from sea level rise 
Loss of land - I.55 
Protection of sheltered areas - 0go 
Protection of open coasts -2-84 
Hotels, lodging, recreation ? 
Total 
Central estimate 
Billions, I98I level of national income -6-23 
Percentage of national income -0-26 
Sourcesfor Table 6: Underlying data on impacts are summarised in EPA (I988). Translation into national- 
income accounts by author. Details are available on request. 
7 See National Research Council (I978). 
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damage from a 30 warming is likely to be around % of national income for the 
United States in terms of those variables we have been able to quantify. This 
figure is clearly incomplete, for it neglects a number of areas that are either 
inadequately studied or inherently unquantifiable. We might raise the number 
to around I % of total global income to allow for these unmeasured and 
unquantifiable factors, although such an adjustment is purely ad hoc. It is not 
possible to give precise error bounds around this figure, but my hunch is that 
the overall impact upon human activity is unlikely to be larger than 200 of 
total output. 
A full assessment of the impact of greenhouse warming must, of course, 
include regions outside the United States. To date, studies for other countries 
are fragmentary, and is not possible to make any firm conclusions at this time. 
A preliminary reading of the evidence is that other advanced industrial 
countries will experience modest impacts similar to those of the United States. 
On the other hand, small and poor countries, particularly ones with low 
population mobility in narrowly restricted climatic zones, may be severely 
affected. Much more work on the potential impact of climate change on 
developing countries needs to be done. 
These remarks lead to a surprising conclusion. Climate change is likely to 
produce a combination of gains and losses with no strong presumption of 
substantial net economic damages. This is not an argument in favour of climate 
change or a laissez-faire attitude to the greenhouse effect. Rather, it suggest 
that a careful weighing of costs and damages will be necessary if a sensible 
strategy is to be devised. 
VII. AN EFFICIENT POLICY FOR SLOWING GREENHOUSE WARMING 
We can now provide estimates of an efficient policy for slowing greenhouse 
warming,8 where this is described in equations (7) through (9). In this analysis, 
we assume a baseline in which there are no greenhouse policies in place. This 
approach is taken because few countries have actually decided upon their 
greenhouse policies and because we are attempting to determine a 'zero-base', 
most efficient policy. 
We begin by tabulating in Table 7 the calculated costs and damages that are 
drawn from the findings above. Column (i) shows the percentage reduction in 
GHGs from an uncontrolled level. Columns (2) and (3) show the costs of GHG 
reductions from Figure 2. The final column displays the estimated total 
discounted damages associated with the given level of reduction of GHG 
emissions, this figure being derived from the estimates in Table 3. 
The efficient level of GHG reduction is shown in Table 7 for the middle level 
of damages and for a discount rate that is I 0 above the growth rate (that is, 
8 In order to make the damage estimates comparable with the cost estimates, we need to put them into 
the same units. The conversion is made using the analysis of section IV. Recall that the present value of 
damages from a unit of GHG emissions is given by the relationship that marginal damage per unit of GHG 
emission= #t/0'(T*) rPAE, where the variables are defined in section (IV). Table 3 shows alternative 
estimates of the damage from C02-equivalent emissions for different values of the discount rate and the 
damage function. 
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Table 7 
Calculation of costs and benefits for different levels of reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions 
( I) (2) (3) (4) 
Reduction of Marginal Total Total 
GHG emissions cost of cost of benefit of 
(as percentage reduction reduction reduction 
of base level) ($ per t C) ($ billion/yr) ($ billion/yr) 
0 010 010 010 
I 0-5 0?04 o-6 
2 I-O OI2 I2 
3 I.5 0-24 I-8 
4 2-0 0?40 2'4 
5 2'6 o-6 i 3-0 
I0 5 3 2-2 5 9 
* II 8-o 2-9 6-5 
I5 I6.3 6-8 8-9 
20 28-o I6-3 I I-9 
25 40-2 30'7 I4.8 
30 53 3 49 5 I 7'8 
40 899 Io8'o 23.7 
50 I 20-0 I9I*0 29-6 
6o I7I0 309 0 35.6 
75 285-0 58I*o 444 
* Most efficient level of control of GHG emissions for medium damage level. 
Source: For both costs and benefits, calculations use I989 levels of world greenhouse gas emissions and 
world output. Cost estimates shown in Fig. 3. Estimates of benefits assume parameters given in Table 3. 
r-h = o-oi per year). This estimate corresponds to the middle damage 
estimate in column (4) of Table 3 of $7-33 per ton of CO2 equivalent. Equating 
the marginal damage with the marginal cost leads to an efficient level of 
control, shown with the asterisk in Table 7, of II % of GHG emissions. At the 
efficient control level, the total cost of reducing emissions is around $3 billion 
per year while the total benefit is estimated to be around $6 billion per year. 
The same outcome is illustrated in Figure 3, which puts together the 
empirical marginal costs and damage curves. The horizontal axis shows the 
reduction in GHGs. The curve marked 'MC: All GHGs' is our estimate of the 
marginal cost of GHG reduction shown in Figure 2. The horizontal curves 
marked Low, Medium, and High Damage correspond to damage estimates in 
Table 3 of $I-83, $7 33, and $66 per ton of CO2 equivalent. The low, medium, 
and high damage curves are, respectively, (i) economic costs actually identified 
in this study (% 00 of total output), (ii) the costs raised to I percentage point to 
allow for a significant amount of potential unmeasured damage, and (iii) an 
estimate of 20 to allow for maximum plausible damages. The first two figures 
use the middle discount rate of (r-/h) equal to I %, while the third uses a value 
of r-h of o. 
The efficient policy is found at the intersection of the relevant damage curve 
with the marginal cost curve. The medium case was shown in Table 7 and leads 
to a current reduction of i i % of GHG emissions. At the low damage estimate, 
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Fig. 3. Marginal cost and damages. 
there is very little GHG emission reduction for its own sake. At the extreme end 
the high damage estimate, about one-third of total GHG emissions would be 
reduced. 
The same figure also presents the results for the high and medium policies in 
a manner that allows us to determine the contribution of different GHGs to the 
total reduction. For the medium damage estimate, the efficient policy totals 
about i i 00 reduction in C02-equivalent emissions. Of this virtually none 
comes from trees, 2 %from the reduction of C02, and 9?0 comes from the 
reduction in CFC emissions. All options suggest a significant reduction in the 
use of CFCs and that little can be realised through forestry options. The main 
difference among the policies is the extent to which CO2 emissions are 
reduced?. 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
The present study has investigated strategies for coping with the likelihood of 
significant greenhouse warming over the coming century. It has focussed 
primarily upon data based on the United States and extrapolated to the rest 
of the world. The principal conclusions are as follows. 
First, an efficient strategy for coping with greenhouse warming must weigh 
the costs and benefits of different policies. We have surveyed the economic 
literature on the costs of abatement and the damages from greenhouse 
warming. Estimates of both costs and damages are highly uncertain and 
9 This study assumes that damages are linear in concentrations; this assumption makes the optimal policy 
independent of the steady-state concentrations. A more plausible approach, for which there is some evidence, 
would be that increases in marginal damages are rising in the extent and rate of climate change. If the 
damage function is quadratic, then the marginal damage would be proportional to concentrations. The 
estimates in this paper are then easily adjusted by multiplying the damage estimates in columns (3) to (5) 
of Table 3 by the ratio of steady-state temperature increase to the CO2-doubling temperature increase. 
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incomplete, and our estimates are therefore highly tentative. We investigate 
the impact of climate change coming from an equilibrium doubling of C02- 
equivalent atmospheric concentrations, which we take to be a 3 ?C rise in 
global mean surface temperature along with the associated changes in climate. 
The flow of damages identified from this climate change is estimated to be 
about 1% of output for today's United States economy. There are clearly 
unmeasured and unmeasurable impacts, which might raise this impact to i 00 
or at most 2%0 of total global output, although these higher figures are no more 
than an informed hunch. 
Second, we examined three different policy measures (reducing C02 
emissions, CFC reduction, and afforestation), and have calculated an overall 
marginal -cost of GHG reduction. We find that about IO % of GHG emissions 
can be reduced at extremely low cost; above that level, the marginal cost of 
abatement rises sharply. Using today's economy as a base, the long-run 
marginal cost of reducing GHG emissions is estimated to be $40 per ton C for 
a 25 0 reduction and $I20 per ton for a 50 0 reduction. The total global costs 
of these reductions are about $2 billion per year for a i0% reduction, $3 
billion for a 25 0 reduction, and $I9I billion per year for a 50 0 reduction. 
Third, putting together our marginal cost and marginal damage schedules, 
we can calculate the efficient greenhouse policy. For the low damage 
function - which includes only identified costs and uses a middle discount 
rate - we estimate the marginal damage of greenhouse gases to be about 
$ I *83 per ton of C in C02 equivalent, which suggests very little C02 abatement. 
For the medium damage function, which assumes damage from greenhouse 
warming of i % of GNP, the cost is reckoned at $7 33 per ton carbon; in this 
case, the efficient reduction is I I % of total GHG emissions. In this case, CFCs 
are substantially reduced, and C02 emissions are reduced by about 2 0. In the 
high damage case, with damages taken to be 2 0 of total output and with no 
discounting, GHG emissions are reduced by about one-third. 
Fourth, the appropriate level of control depends critically upon three central 
parameters of the climate-economic system: the cost of control of GHGs, the 
damage to the human societies from greenhouse warming, and the time 
dynamics as reflected in the rate of discount of future goods and services along 
with the time lags in the reaction of the climate to emissions. The efficient 
degree of control of GHGs would be essentially zero in the case of high costs, 
low damages, and high discounting; by contrast, in the case of no discounting 
and high damages, the efficient degree of control is close to one-third of GHG 
emissions. 
Finally, it should be emphasised that this analysis has a number of important 
oversimplifications. It simplifies enormously many of the intricate economic 
and climatic complexities by taking a global view of economic activity and a 
simple dynamic specification of emissions, concentrations, and economic 
growth. It also bases the economic damage assumptions upon the i98I sectoral 
composition of the United States economy and assumes that this composition 
will hold for the global economy in the mid-2 ISt century. In addition it ignores 
other routes for investing society's resources - such as factories, education, 
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research, and health - and focusses on a single tradeoff between future and 
present consumption. Moreover, the calculations omit other potential market 
failures, such as ozone depletion or air pollution, which might reinforce or 
weaken the logic behind greenhouse gas reduction. And finally, it ignores the 
issues of uncertainty, in which risk aversion and the possibility of learning may 
modify the stringency and timing of control strategies. 
Notwithstanding these simplifications, the approach laid out here may help 
clarify the questions and help identify the scientific, economic, and policy issues 
that must underpin any rational decision. Once the fundamental concepts are 
clear, it is relatively straightforward to move to a more detailed disaggregated 
approach so as to fine tune the calculations. But whether we use simple 
approaches like the present one or more elaborate models, we must balance 
costs and damages if we are to preserve our precious time and resources for the 
most important threats to our health and happiness. 
Yale University and the Cowles Foundation. 
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